Abstract-The secure provision of mobile computing and telecommunication services is rapidly increasing in importance as both demand and applications for such services continue to grow. This paper is concerned with the design of public key based protocols suitable for application in upcoming third-generation mobile systems such as Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service. Candidate protocols are considered for the authentication of a mobile user to a value-added service provider with initialization of a mechanism enabling payment for the value-added service. A set of goals for such a protocol are identified, as are a number of generic attacks; these goals and attacks are then used to evaluate the suitability of seven candidate third-generation user-to-network authentication protocols. Many of these candidate protocols are shown to have highly undesirable features.
I. INTRODUCTION
M OBILE computing and telecommunications are currently areas of rapid growth, as the technology necessary to widely implement relevant services is becoming increasingly available. The advantages of wireless communications are likely to see these technologies featured in upcoming third-generation mobile systems such as Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service and offering many new services that will revolutionize the way that society handles information. In particular, these technologies are almost certain to find use in environments where a (roaming) mobile user purchases value-added services (VASs) from a value-added service provider (VASP). This paper evaluates a number of candidate third-generation security protocols that mutually authenticate a mobile user and VASP and initialize an appropriate payment mechanism.
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should be minimized. It is worth noting that this constraint is likely to erode with time as mobile devices become more powerful. It is anticipated that in the future, the more significant performance constraint may arise at the server (VASP) end, which could become a bottleneck during multiple service requests. For this reason, we also pay attention to the computational effort required by the VASP, seeking to keep this as low as possible. Moreover, the communications bandwidth between the user and VASP may be limited, and hence protocol messages should be kept as short as possible. The candidate protocols considered mostly use public key techniques, which are generally more computationally intensive than symmetric cryptography. However, use of public key cryptography has significant advantages within large and complex communication networks, including scalability, easier key management, and the lack of need for online authentication servers. It is highly desirable that a user-to-VASP authentication and payment initialization (API) process be closely based on the type of user-to-network authentication process that is likely to be used for system setup procedures (for example, user-to-network call setup procedures in a mobile telecommunications network). This allows efficient integration of the two processes. For this reason, we evaluate both user-to-network authentication protocols (which can be extended to API) and explicit API protocols. In the following sections, we identify formal goals of an API protocol and consider a number of possible protocol attacks. We then consider seven candidate API protocols and evaluate them against the API goals, showing that several have fundamental weaknesses. We conclude with a general comparison of the seven candidates.
II. API PROTOCOL GOALS
An API protocol begins with a mobile user contacting a VASP for the first time over the vulnerable "air interface" of a typical mobile telecommunications network. Each entity has a certified copy of its own public key but needs a certified copy of the other's public key. Both entities need to authenticate one another, establish a common cryptographic key, and initiate a payment scheme. The precise protocol goals are as follows (we refer the reader to Menezes et al. [23] for formal definitions of the italicised terms):
1) mutual entity authentication of user and VASP (to protect against masquerade of either entity over the air interface); 2) exchange of certified public keys between user and VASP (to support the authentication and key establishment processes);
3) mutual key agreement of a session key between user and VASP (to protect data subsequently exchanged between user and VASP); 4) joint key control of the session key (to prevent either party's accidentally or deliberately choosing a weakened key); 5) mutual implicit key authentication (to ensure that no other party can obtain the established session key); 6) mutual key confirmation (so that both user and VASP have assurance that they both possess the same shared session key); 7) mutual assurance of key freshness (to prevent replays of old messages being used to reestablish an "old," possibly compromised, session key); 8) confidentiality of the user identity over the air interface (to prevent an interceptor of air interface communications from learning the mobile user's identity and/or being able to track particular mobile users; see Mitchell and Chen [24] ); 9) initialization of the payment mechanism (to support payment for VASs); 10) nonrepudiation of the payment initialization data (to support payment for VASs). Goals 1)-8) are suitable for a user-to-network authentication protocol. It is not the intention of this paper to discuss payment mechanisms for VASs in mobile computing networks; see Horn and Preneel [15] and Martin et al. [22] for a more detailed discussion. We assume that the API protocol initiates a suitable micropayment scheme such as those based on one-way hash chains proposed in Pedersen [28] and Rivest and Shamir [29] . Such schemes typically involve the VASP's proposing some charging-related data to the user and the user's committing to these data and some initialization values using a digital signature. Throughout this paper, we assume the use of digital signatures with appendix. We note that the use of digital signatures with message recovery (see [23] for an explanation of the differences) may further simplify some of the protocols.
III. PROTOCOL ATTACKS
In this section, we describe a number of possible attacks against API protocols that feature in the proceeding discussion. 1) Signer verification attack. User anonymity can be compromised if an attacker can obtain a digital signature generated by the user. If the data were signed using a signature system giving (partial) message recovery, such as ISO/IEC 9796-2 signatures [16] , then an attacker who has access to a large set of public verification keys applies them successively to the signature; if the verification process fails, then the attacker can assume that the owner of that key is not the signer. A similar attack applies to other signature systems if the attacker also has access to the (hashed) data that were signed. 2) Content verification attack. This attack is similar in principle to a signer verification attack and can be used to determine a piece of data in a signature that is unknown to the attacker (but that comes from a limited set of possible values). Assume that the attacker has a cleartext signature and knows both the signer and most of the data that were signed. The attacker repeatedly guesses the missing data and attempts to verify the signature with the known user's verification key. 3) Source substitution attack. A source substitution attack as defined in Diffie et al. [10] involves an attacker's taking another entity's public key and managing to obtain a certificate in the name of the attacker for that public key value. This then allows the attacker to masquerade as the other entity in a number of situations, such as when claiming to be the signer of data. Although such attacks can be prevented if a certification authority insists on proof of knowledge of the corresponding private key before issuing a certificate, it is wise to avoid exposure to such attacks. 4) Time-memory tradeoff attack. A time-memory tradeoff attack can be used to determine data for which a hashed version is available. Suppose that data contains bits, and has been observed. The attacker precomputes and stores 2 values of . When the value is observed during the protocol run, the attacker compares this value with the precomputed values. The probability of success is 2
, and thus the attacker will need to intercept 2 such values for every successful capture of . Other versions of this type of attack have been used in different cryptanalytic contexts; see, for example, Borst et al. [5] and Hellmann [14] . 5) Codebook attack. Here, an attacker keeps a record of data that is encrypted using the same symmetric key. Even if the plaintext is not known, if the same data are ever encrypted a second time with the same key, then the attacker can identify this from the stored record. 6) Partial chosen key attack. This type of attack was described in Mitchell et al. [25] and is relevant to protocols claimed to offer joint key control. Suppose that two entities and both contribute random inputs to the computation of a session key , but that first sends to . It is possible for to then compute 2 variants of and the corresponding before sending to . In this way, entity can "select" approximately bits of the joint key. The value of , and hence the degree of imbalance in the key control, is constrained by the computing resources and time available for to complete this process. Note that most public key based key agreement protocols currently specified in ISO standards-for example, ISO/IEC 11 770-3 [17] -are potentially vulnerable to partial chosen key attacks. 7) Key separation attack. Suppose entity A encrypts something during the authentication protocol (with entity B) using a symmetric key . Now suppose that as part of a completely different protocol between entity E and entity A, entity E sends data to A that A encrypts with the same key and returns to E. It is possible that entity E could exploit this lack of key separation to replace messages sent during the first protocol (between A and B) with messages manufactured during the second (by sending chosen messages to A for encryption using ). Protocols are particularly vulnerable to a key separation attack if their final message (from A to B say) is encrypted. In this case, it may be possible for E to replace the message sent on to B while A believes that the protocol has executed correctly. Note that this kind of attack is avoided if, during any subsequent protocol that requires symmetric encryption with key , key is replaced by a key derived from (by applying a pseudorandom function, for example) when used as a session key under natural assumptions on the encryption scheme. In this way, the key used during authentication is separated from the key later used for data encryption. Other solutions to thwart the attack are possible. 8) Known key attacks. This attack applies if, in the event that an old session key is compromised, future session keys can also be compromised. Known key attacks are related to those discussed by Denning and Sacco [8] with respect to the use of timestamps to prevent message replay. Such attacks are of particular concern in any environment where the probability of compromise of session keys is significantly greater than that of long-term keys (see Menezes et al. [23] for further discussion).
IV. SEVEN USER-TO-NETWORK PROTOCOLS
We now consider seven third-generation candidate API protocols. We indicate any minor modifications to an established authentication protocol that we have added to make it suitable for API. Note that the seven selected protocols were chosen because they are either established authentication protocols worth evaluating for our API scenario (STS and Aziz-Diffie) or recently proposed protocols of which we are unaware of published weaknesses. Several other candidate authentication protocols such as those recently proposed by Park [27] and Yi et al. [31] have already been found to have significant weaknesses; see Boyd and Park [6] and Martin and Mitchell [21] . A number of the protocols involve the use of a trusted third party (TTP). The following general notation is used throughout the descriptions (the reader is referred to Menezes et al. [23] for further explanation of the basic cryptographic primitives referred to below):
generator of a multiplicative group in which discrete logarithms are hard; ID identifier of the user; ID identifier of the VASP; ID identifier of a TTP; private key of the user; private key of the VASP; random nonce generated by the user; random nonce generated by the VASP; TS a timestamp generated by the VASP; session key established between the user and the VASP; symmetric encryption of using key ; the asymmetric encryption of using public key ; result of applying a one-way hash function to input ; Sig value signed by the TTP; Sig value signed by the user; Sig value signed by the VASP; cd charging-related data; py payment initialization data. Our descriptions of the seven protocols are necessarily brief, and we refer the interested reader to the original sources for fuller discussions of design and implementation issues.
A. The STS Protocol
The station-to-station (STS) protocol proposed by Diffie et al. [10] is a three-pass Diffie-Hellman variant that establishes a shared session key between two parties with mutual entity authentication and mutual explicit key authentication. Although not explicitly designed for a mobile scenario, we consider it here because it meets almost all protocol goals (with the main exception of those relating to initialization of the payment scheme). The version we describe in Fig. 1 is based on the STS protocol described in Menezes et al. [23] , with the additional exchange of (encrypted) certified public signature keys. The following additional notation is needed: CertU certified public signature key of the user; CertV certified public signature key of the VASP.
In Fig. 1 , the user generates a temporary public key and transfers it to the VASP in (1) . The VASP generates a temporary private key and can now compute the session key . The VASP replies in (2) with its temporary public key, its certified public signature key, and an encrypted signed copy of both temporary public keys. After verifying the VASP's signature, the user is now able to compute and acknowledges this by sending the encrypted signed temporary public keys in (3). CertU is included in the encrypted part of (3) to preserve user anonymity over the air interface. The VASP verifies the user's signature to conclude the protocol.
The STS protocol appears to meet goals 1)-8) and has the advantage that goals 9) and 10) can be met by simply including the payment scheme initialization data in the signature of the third message. Blake-Wilson and Menezes [4] observe that certain other variants of the STS protocol may not satisfy goal 5), and provide some advice on implementation of the STS protocol as described in Fig. 1 . The main disadvantage with the STS protocol, however, is the level of computational effort at both the user and VASP ends of the protocol. Partial chosen key attacks and key separation attacks are technically possible (but see Section III).
B. The Aziz-Diffie Protocol
The protocol proposed by Aziz and Diffie [2] is illustrated in Fig. 2 . We need the following additional notation: CertU certified public verification key of user; CertV certified public verification key of VASP; random nonce generated by the user; public key of the user; public key of the VASP.
The Aziz-Diffie protocol is distinctive in that the common key is not computed using a Diffie-Hellman variant. The protocol begins with the user's generating a random nonce and sending it and the user's certificate to the VASP in Fig. 2, (1) . The VASP generates a nonce, encrypts it using the user's public key, and then sends this to the user in (2), along with a signature on both nonces and the VASP's certificate. The user decrypts and verifies the contents of (2). The user then generates a second nonce and forms the key by adding this to the VASP's nonce. Finally, the user encrypts this second nonce with the VASP's public key and sends this to the VASP in (3), including a signed copy of both encrypted nonces. The VASP decrypts and verifies the contents of (3) and is now also able to compute .
The protocol appears to meet goals 1)-5) and 7). It can be easily modified to incorporate the last two goals since the user already signs data in the third message. The protocol does not offer key confirmation in either direction. More seriously, it does not offer user confidentiality over the air interface because CertU is sent in clear in the first message. The obvious solution, i.e., to encrypt this message with , does not guarantee confidentiality, as the signature in the third message is vulnerable to a signer verification attack.
C. The Revised BCY Protocol
The BCY protocol was first proposed by Beller et al. [3] and was subsequently improved, first by Carlsen [7] and then by Mu and Varadharajan [26] . We refer to the protocol in [26] as the Revised BCY protocol and illustrate it in Fig. 3 . We need the following additional notation: product of two large primes; CertU special user certificate; CertV special VASP certificate; key encrypting key established between the user and the VASP. The value is the public key of in the modular square root (MSR) public key system; see Williams [30] , where the private key is represented by the corresponding factorization. Encryption of is performed by taking the square of modulo the public key, and decryption is performed by taking square roots.
In the Revised BCY protocol, the MSR system is used for creating certificates, and the Diffie-Hellman technique is used to establish the common key. In particular, CertU is formed by a certificate authority signing the user's public Diffie-Hellman key using the MSR system, and CertV is formed by a certificate authority signing the VASP's public Diffie-Hellman key together with the VASP's public MSR key using the MSR system. Both of these certificates must be bound to their owners by the inclusion of the appropriate identifier [26] .
The Revised BCY protocol begins with the VASP's generating a random nonce and sending this and the special VASP certificate to the user in (1). The user now generates a random nonce, encrypts it using MSR, and sends the result to the VASP in (2) . The user also sends a message in (2), which includes its public Diffie-Hellman key and special certificate, all encrypted using the user's random nonce. The VASP now decrypts the first part of (2) using MSR to obtain the user's nonce. Both entities now extract the other's public Diffie-Hellman key from the corresponding special certificate and compute . They each then use the result to encrypt the user's nonce in order to compute .
It would seem that an extension of the Revised BCY protocol to meet the last two goals of Section II would involve at least one extra signature at the user end and one extra verification at the VASP end. Unfortunately, the Revised BCY protocol meets very few of our protocol goals. There is no entity authentication in either direction, since anyone can play the roles of either the user or VASP without revealing this to the other entity. Neither is there mutual implicit key authentication, since (for example) the VASP cannot be sure that only the user knows , nor any level of key confirmation. In fact, only goals 2), 3), and 8) from the list in Section II appear to be achieved.
The reason for the disappointing performance of the Revised BCY protocol against goals 1)-8) is that, although designed for a similar application, it can be deduced from [3] that the envisaged threat scenario is quite different. The protocol emphasis is on key agreement and identity and location privacy rather than authentication. The protocol thwarts passive attackers on the air interface, but permanent insiders, who can tap information in real time, are not regarded as a threat. This would seem rather unrealistic since fraudulent base stations for certain mobile systems have been available for some time. 
D. The Aydos-Sunar-Koç Protocol
Aydos, Sunar, and Koç [1] describe a protocol (the ASK protocol) providing "'authentication and key agreement" for a wireless environment. Their protocol uses elliptic-curve techniques for key agreement. For uniformity of presentation, we have translated the ASK scheme into the more normal Diffie-Hellman notation, where we represent the group multiplicatively.
The ASK protocol is as described in Fig. 4 . The protocol specification uses the following additional notation:
public key agreement key of user ( , where is user's private key); public key agreement key of VASP ( , where is VASP's private key); CertU certified public key agreement key ( ) of the user; CertV certified public key agreement key of the VASP. A shared key is established and used in the protocol; this key will always be the same every time a particular user/VASP pair communicate. During the protocol, the user and VASP establish a session key , which does vary from one protocol instance to another.
The ASK protocol opens with a Diffie-Hellman exchange of public key agreement keys in (1) and (2), which results in each entity's being able to compute the shared key . The VASP then generates a random nonce and multiplies it by to establish the session key . The VASP sends this nonce and its certificate to the user in (3), both encrypted using . The user decrypts (3) to obtain the VASP's nonce and then computes the session key. Finally, the user sends its certificate to the VASP in (4), also encrypted using . Unfortunately, despite claims in [1] , very few of the goals are met because of the following problems.
1) The VASP is not authenticated to the user because the first and third messages could be intercepted and replayed by a third party (neither the first or third messages contain any information that will enable the user to check their freshness). 2) User identity confidentiality may be compromised, since the user's public key is sent in clear in the second message. Linking protocol instances involving the same user will thus be straightforward, and if the public key of a user is known, then user confidentiality is completely lost.
3) Because there is no freshness checking of the third message, if a session key should ever be compromised, then known key attacks become possible. More specifically, it means that the user has no way of checking the "freshness" of the session key . 4) There are potential problems with the use of symmetric encryption in the third and fourth messages. The authors suggest in [1] that a block or stream cipher could be used. However, given that the third and fourth messages involve encryption using the same shared key, if a stream cipher is used, then knowledge of one of CertU and CertV will reveal the other, providing another threat to identity confidentiality. 5) There are no signatures used in the protocol, and hence providing nonrepudiation services will require protocol enhancements. The only goals that are met by the protocol would appear to be goals 2), 3), and 4). Extending the ASK protocol to the last two goals of Section II will involve at least one extra signature at the user end and one extra verification at the VASP end.
E. The Zhou-Lam Protocol
Zhou and Lam [32] describe a pair of protocols that respectively provide user-to-VASP authentication and initialization of a payment mechanism within a slightly different context than the one so far described. As a result of this, and of several concerns with details of this protocol, we provide some extra discussion here. They consider the situation where a user roams into a network and wishes to both register with this "roamed network" (involving mutual authentication) and set up a payment mechanism with this network. This is readily recast into the environment considered in this paper by mapping the "roamed network" into the VASP. We represent the "home network" by a TTP.
The first of the Zhou-Lam protocols, the "Registration Protocol," provides mutual authentication between a mobile user and VASP (with the online assistance of a TTP, necessary because of the use of symmetric cryptography). In addition, apart from establishing a shared session key between the user and VASP, it also provides the user with a temporary signature key, the VASP with the verification function for this signature key, and both the user and VASP with a temporary user identifier. The signature key is designed for use in the second protocol, the "Service Request Protocol," which initializes the payment scheme (and can, in principle at least, be used many times before the Registration Protocol needs to be used again). The protocol relies on the previous establishment of two "long term" keys, shared by the user and TTP and the VASP and TTP, respectively.
The Registration Protocol is as described in Fig. 5 temporary private signature key for user; TID temporary identity for the user; expiry date/time for the user's temporary signature key.
The Registration Protocol opens with the generation of a random nonce by the user. The user then sends this nonce to the VASP in (1), as well as a message encrypted using the public key of the TTP that includes this nonce. The VASP generates a random nonce and sends this to the TTP in (2) . The VASP also forwards in (2) the encrypted message sent by the user in (1). The TTP decrypts this incoming message and generates a session key , as well as a temporary verification/signature key pair and a temporary identity for the user. The TTP then prepares a message consisting of three components. The first component is a list of values that includes the session key, the user's temporary verification key, and the user's temporary identity, all encrypted using the long-term VASP-TTP shared key. The second component is a signature on, among other things, the user's temporary verification key. The third component is similar to the first component, except that it is encrypted using the long-term user-TTP shared key, and replaces the temporary verification key of the user with the temporary signature key of the user. The TTP sends all three components to the VASP in (3). The VASP decrypts the first component and extracts , verifies the second component, and forwards the third component to the user in (4) . The VASP also sends in (4) a hash of the session key and the user's nonce. The user decrypts the component, extracts , and verifies the hash.
Note that, as pointed out in [32] , for billing purposes the TTP needs to retain the map between the user's permanent identity and the temporary identity TID . The Service Request Protocol is then as specified in Fig. 6 .
The Service Request Protocol consists simply of a message (5) from the user to the VASP that includes a request for service and a signature on the user's temporary identity and charging/payment initialization data. The VASP verifies this signature using the user's temporary verification key and returns in (6) a hash of the session key and the service request. The user verifies this hash to conclude the protocol.
We start our analysis of these two protocols by noting some anomalies in the protocol specifications.
1) The encrypted string sent from user to TTP via the VASP at the start of the Registration Protocol is asymmetrically encrypted rather than being encrypted using because the TTP will not know the user's identity in advance. The encrypted string is the only means by which the TTP can identify the user. However, the only user-specific information in this string is the shared key , and this may not be a convenient way for the TTP to identify the user. Moreover, if is used in this way, it is serving two different functions, i.e., to identify the user and to confirm the origin of data. For these reasons, it would be better to explicitly include ID in the encrypted string sent from the user to the TTP via the VASP. 2) There is an implicit assumption that the asymmetric encryption function provides inherent "binding together" of data items, i.e., it is necessary for the security of the protocol that an interceptor cannot manipulate an encrypted string to produce another one with a predictable decryption, even if part of the plaintext is known. This assumption holds for some public key encryption schemes such as RSA, as long as all the data fits in one "block," but it is not clear that it is guaranteed for all such schemes. 3) It is also implicitly assumed that the symmetric encryption used to protect data sent from TTP to user via the VASP provides data integrity and origin authentication as well as confidentiality. If it does not, a malicious active interceptor might, for example, be able to persuade the user to accept a different key . This combination of confidentiality and integrity protection is not easy to achieve in practice, and will typically require the computation of a MAC on the data using one variant of the key, followed by data encryption using a second key variant (see also recent work by Gligor and Donescu [13] and Jutla [19] , who propose new modes of operation of block ciphers that claim to provide both confidentiality and message integrity). 4) The value of the signed string sent from the TTP to the VASP in the Registration Protocol is unclear. Although it is intended to commit the TTP to the temporary identity TID and the temporary verification key , problems arise because there are no guarantees regarding the "freshness" of the signed string. The TTP could issue the same signed string (and the same temporary identity and signature/verification key pair) to a number of users of a single VASP. When the VASP presents signed commitments for payments by these users, the TTP could falsely refuse to honor them on the grounds that he only issued the signed string once. This problem could be avoided by requiring the TTP to include the nonce inside the signed string it supplies to the VASP.
The Registration Protocol does not provide entity authentication of user to VASP, but this service is not strictly necessary
Sig ID (3) Fig. 7 . The Boyd-Park protocol.
within the registration process itself, since the subsequent receipt of messages signed using the user's temporary signature key (in the Service Request Protocol) will implicitly prove the user's presence during the registration process. There is no need for exchange of certified public keys in this protocol. Joint key control is not provided as the key is selected by the TTP. There is the possibility of a limited content verification attack on the signed string sent from the TTP to the VASP, since an interceptor will know all the signed data except for the user's verification key and its expiry date. Time-memory tradeoff attacks are possible on the hashed value sent from VASP to user in the Service Request Protocol (since the parameter Req may only take a few different values), which implies that the key should contain enough bits (e.g., 128 or more) to resist such attacks.
F. The Boyd-Park Protocol
The protocol proposed in Boyd and Park [6] is illustrated in Fig. 7 . The Boyd-Park protocol specification uses the following additional notation: public key of the VASP.
The Boyd-Park protocol begins with the user's generating a random nonce and sending it to the VASP in (1), encrypted using the public key of the VASP. The VASP decrypts this message, generates a random nonce of its own, and computes key by hashing these two nonces together. The VASP then sends its nonce to the user in (2), including the user's nonce encrypted using . The user can now also compute , confirming it by decrypting the second part of (2). Finally, the user signs a message that includes a hash of the VASP's nonce together with and sends this in (3) to the VASP. The VASP verifies this signature to conclude the protocol.
The Boyd-Park protocol is interesting because it does not use a Diffie-Hellman variant to establish the common key. Rather, the key is a hash of random nonces selected by the user and the VASP, with only the nonce of the user's being a secret value. In this respect, the key is very efficient for both entities to compute. The Boyd-Park protocol appears to satisfy all the goals except for goal 2), the exchange of certified public keys, and the last two goals. The last two goals can easily be met because the Boyd-Park protocol involves a signature in the third message from the user to VASP. Meeting goal 2) is less straightforward because, although the user can easily send its encrypted certificate to the VASP in the first message, the user needs the public key of the VASP to encrypt this message. Thus, to meet all the goals, the Boyd-Park protocol must involve an additional initial pass in which the user obtains, and verifies, the public key of the VASP. The Boyd-Park protocol is vulnerable to a signer verification attack, but in [6] it is suggested that this can be prevented by the use of ElGamal signatures (or suitable variants).
G. The ASPeCT Protocol
The ASPeCT protocol was developed by the European Commission ACTS project ASPeCT, 1 and versions of the protocol have previously appeared in Horn and Preneel [15] and Martin et al. [22] . The protocol that is shown in Fig. 8 is explicitly designed as an API protocol. The following additional notation is used: ID identifier of the user's CA; CertU certified public signature key of user; CertV certified public key agreement key of the VASP; one-way hash functions (see [15] for detailed requirements).
The ASPeCT protocol also establishes the session key using a variant of Diffie-Hellman that is based on the private key of the VASP and a random nonce generated by the user. The user commences by generating a random nonce, uses it to compute a temporary public key, and sends this to the VASP in (1), along with an identifier of the TTP that can verify the user's certificate. The VASP generates a random nonce and computes key . In (2), the VASP sends a certified copy of his public key, details of the charging data, a timestamp (for later use in the payment process), and its random nonce, and signifies knowledge of by sending a copy of it hashed with its random nonce and identity. On receipt of (2), the user can now also compute . The user replies in (3) by encrypting a signed hashed copy of a number of protocol variables and his certified public signature key. The signature provides nonrepudiation on the billing data, satisfying the last goal in Section II. The VASP decrypts the message received in (3) and verifies the signature to conclude the protocol.
The ASPeCT protocol meets all the required API goals (see [15] for a detailed justification). We note that signer and content verification attacks are prevented by encryption of the signature in the third message. The inclusion of an identifier for the VASP and a random value in the hash of the second message prevents source substitution attacks and practical time-memory tradeoff attack to find . As the key is equal in two different protocol runs with negligible probability, the ASPeCT protocol is not vulnerable to codebook attacks to determine . The protocol is potentially vulnerable to partial chosen key and key separation attacks (but see Section III).
V. COMPARISON OF PROTOCOLS
In this section, we make a short comparison between the candidate protocols.
A. Cryptographic Methods
The cryptographic technology required in most of the seven protocols is very similar. In all the protocols except Aziz-Diffie, Zhou-Lam, and Boyd-Park, the shared session key established between the user and VASP is computed using a variant of Diffie-Hellman. All the protocols except Aziz-Diffie require a symmetric encryption algorithm. To satisfy the last two goals, all the protocols will at least require the user to perform digital signatures. The Zhou-Lam, Boyd-Park, and ASPeCT protocols also use a one-way hash function. The Revised BCY protocol is unique in requiring the use of the MSR public key system. The most significant cryptographic difference between all of these protocols is probably the fact that the Zhou-Lam protocol is the only one that is almost entirely symmetric key based, and requires shared symmetric keys to have already been established and maintained between the user and VASP and the VASP and the TTP.
B. Procedural and Communication Issues
Some slight differences exist in the protocol procedures. The first pass of the Revised BCY and ASK (and potentially Boyd-Park) protocols is from the VASP, while in the STS, Aziz-Diffie, Zhou-Lam, and ASPeCT protocols, it is from the user. The user-to-VASP scenario requires the user to initiate the session somehow, and so it makes some sense for the user to start the protocol, although this is not such an important point. More significant is the fact that the Revised BCY protocol only involves one pass in each direction between the user and VASP, whereas the other protocols have three or four passes. In this respect, the Revised BCY, although it fails to achieve several of the protocol goals, is the most efficient of the protocols.
It is worth commenting that in the ASPeCT protocol, and in all the envisaged extensions of the other protocols to include payment initialization, the actual payment protocol is decoupled from this initialization process. By contrast, the Zhou-Lam protocol links initialization and payment together, both decoupled from the authentication mechanism. The relative merits of these two techniques very much depend on the likely time period over which a series of VAS requests can be made without a subsequent rerunning of the initialization process. The decoupling arrangement of the protocols discussed here is more favorable if the lifetime of temporary public keys is very short, or a series of VAS requests are made to one VASP within a short time period that can all be based on the same initialization data. The alternative decoupling arrangement may be attractive in situations where temporary keys have slightly longer lifetimes, and only one authentication and key establishment based on them is needed in advance of a number of payment requests.
Finally, note that, by use of public key techniques, all protocols but the Zhou-Lam protocol avoid the need for communications between the VASP and the TTP at the time the user establishes its initial relationship with the VASP (unless the appropriate certificates are not in place). The Zhou-Lam protocol's need for routine communications with the TTP involves a significantly increased load on the network. Table I summarizes how the seven protocols (listed from left to right in order of presentation in Section IV) meet the goals of Section II. For goals 9) and 10), an entry indicates that the protocol is easily modified to meet the goal, and indicates that the protocol can be modified to meet the goal, but involves at least one extra signature (one extra pass in the case of the Boyd-Park protocol). See Section IV-E for comments on how well the Zhou-Lam protocol meets goal 1).
C. Meeting the Goals
From Table I , we see that only the STS, Boyd-Park, and ASPeCT protocols meet all the specified goals. Further, two of the protocols, the Revised BCY and ASK protocols, fail to meet at least three of the goals, including the goal of mutual entity authentication.
D. Computational Loads
In Tables II and III , we compare the computational load of the seven protocols. In the first row, we measure the number of precomputable exponentiations, while the number of online exponentiations are counted separately in the second row. The numbers of generic public key encryptions and decryptions are given in the third and fourth rows, respectively; these may well involve exponentiations, but we count them separately when the public key algorithm has not been explicitly specified. Likewise, the numbers of signatures and verifications are, respectively, indicated in the last two rows. Bracketed entries in Tables II and  III indicate figures under the assumption that these protocols have been extended to offer initialization of the payment mechanism and nonrepudiation of the initialization data, in some cases through the addition of one digital signature by the user, and one verification by the VASP.
The results in Table II show that the most computationally efficient protocol is the symmetric key based Zhou-Lam protocol. The Revised BCY protocols involve one (precomputable) exponentiation less than both the ASK and ASPeCT protocols, but with respect to ASPeCT achieves this at the cost of failing to meet several of the required goals. Of the three protocols that meet all the goals of Section II, the Boyd-Park protocol involves the least computational effort at the user end. However, it achieves this at the expense of requiring an extra protocol pass. Of the other two, the ASPeCT protocol involves one verification less than the STS protocol. This gain is also accentuated by the fact that the shorter signature lengths of some ElGamal-type signatures (DSA [12] and elliptic curve variants, for example) make them preferable to RSA-based signatures for implementation on a smartcard, and that these come at an approximate computational cost of one precomputable exponentiation for signing and two exponentiations for verifying (see Menezes et al. [23] ). Of course, the length advantage of certain discrete logarithm signatures over RSA signatures disappears if signatures with message recovery are used. However, such signature schemes are outside the scope of this review, and their use has not been proposed with any of the cited protocols. Thus the approximate number of exponentiations in a run of the STS protocol is seven (two precomputable) versus five (two precomputable) for ASPeCT and four (one precomputable) for Boyd-Park, assuming RSA is used for encryption. The Aziz-Diffie protocol has a similar user overhead to the STS protocol but does not provide all protocol goals.
Although less practically significant at the time of writing (but see comments in Section I), the VASP computational efforts are given in Table III . The balance between user and VASP effort in each protocol is worth noting. The STS, Aziz-Diffie, ASK, and Boyd-Park protocols have very similar user and VASP efforts. The Extended BCY and Zhou-Lam protocols both appear to have succeeded in reducing the user computation with respect to the VASP. The ASPeCT protocol appears at first glance to involve more computation at the user end; however, if ElGamal-type signatures are used, then the effort becomes marginally less at the user end.
E. Message Length
The techniques for keeping the lengths of protocol messages as short as possible are often outside the scope of the protocol descriptions themselves. For the ASPeCT protocol, it is suggested in Horn and Preneel [15] that the user generate signatures using an elliptic curve-based AMV signature, as specified in ISO/IEC FDIS 14 888-3 [18] . The ASPeCT protocol has also been implemented using a streamlined certificate format [15] . Similar procedures could easily be adopted for most of the other protocols.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have provided a clear set of goals for a third-generation mobile system API protocol. We listed some generic attacks against such protocols; the possibility of these attacks has influenced the design of the ASPeCT protocol, and more generally provides a reference point for future protocol design.
Using our defined goals, the suitability of seven candidate API protocols was considered. Four of these are shown to have significant shortcomings. Three of these are largely through the failure to meet all of our protocol goals. A fourth protocol, the Zhou-Lam protocol, largely fails because, although it compares very favorably with the other protocols in terms of computational load, it imposes an increased load on the network because of the need for routine communications with a TTP. Of the three protocols that meet all the protocol goals, the STS protocol was not designed explicitly for such a mobile application and as a result has rather larger computational overheads than are necessary. The Boyd-Park protocol seems to be the most computationally efficient at the user's end, but requires the most communication passes. The ASPeCT protocol was purposely designed for API application, and like the Boyd-Park protocol appears to compare very favorably with the prior art.
